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Abstract
We investigate the interactions between optimal regulation and external credit
constraints. When part of a regulated ¯rm is owned by foreign investors, a credit-
constrained country who wants to send pro¯ts abroad has to generate enough
surplus in the trade account in order to compensate capital out°ows. We show
that the credit constraint translates into a constraint of maximum pro¯ts for the
regulated ¯rm. Overall e±ciency in the regulated sector is reduced to maintain
incentive compatibility. A °exible exchange rate helps relaxing the credit con-
straint. E±ciency is higher than with a ¯xed exchange rate, but still lower than
without credit constraints.
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11 Introduction
The share of the regulated sector in GDP may be quite large in developing countries.
Moreover, the participation of foreign investors in the ownership of regulated ¯rms is
far from being negligible.
Can regulation design be considered independently from the external sector perfor-
mance? Most probably, a regulated ¯rm will want to transfer pro¯ts to its foreign
owners after investing in the host country. However, capital out°ows have to be com-
pensated by in°ows, either from the capital account, via borrowing, or from a surplus
in the trade account. If the country is credit-constrained, the trade account becomes
the only means the country can use to ¯nance capital out°ows.
On the other hand, domestic ownership is not enough for solving the problem. In fact,
domestic agents could exhibit a preference for holding foreign assets, putting pressure
on the trade surplus anyhow.
A well-known result of the theory of incentives in regulation is that optimal regulation
under asymmetric information implies leaving rents to e±cient ¯rms in order to induce
them to actually reveal they are e±cient (see Baron and Myerson (1982) or La®ont and
Tirole (1993)). In some cases, these rents may be quite signi¯cant. If a big proportion
of the rents has to be sent to foreign owners, the country may face a serious problem
trying to increase its exports of goods and services in order to compensate the capital
out°ows. In particular, a low level of exports may force the country to give lower
powered incentives and reduce the regulated sector's overall e±ciency.
In this paper we are interested in the interaction between the optimal regulatory pol-
2icy and the constraints imposed by the external sector. In particular, we analyze how
the optimal regulatory mechanism is modi¯ed when the country is credit-constrained.
La®ont and Matoussi (1995) present a °exible model that includes the possibility of
several contracts both when the agent and the principal are credit-constrained. Lewis
and Sappington (2000) consider the case of potential operators of unknown ability that
are wealth constrained. In our case, it is the principal who must face an additional
constraint in a complementary good necessary to develop the contract. These authors
do not take into account the possibility of a constraint for the principal expressed in a
good di®erent from the good in which the contract is settled. The basic problem in our
model is that the regulated ¯rm's foreign owners want to obtain their rent expressed in
international currency, while producing a non-tradable good for which revenues are ex-
pressed in domestic currency. In this sense, the principal is obliged to make transactions
in a di®erent market in order to provide the ¯rm with enough incentives.
The case of Argentina is a good example of an economy where the share of the regu-
lated sector in GDP is important and international credit constraints are binding; this
situation will last for several years, and it will probably in°uence regulatory policy.
Moreover, Argentina established a currency board regime in 1991 that lasted for ten
years, but recently announced default of its external debt and highly devaluated its
currency. Chisari, Estache, Lambardi, and Romero (2003) build a computable general
equilibrium model for the Argentine economy and analyze the e®ects of the constraints
imposed by the external sector. They show that both the capital account and the
exchange rate regime are relevant variables to choose the regulatory regime.
To analyze this problem, we develop a very simple and stylized model of a small economy
3of three goods, a tradable good, a non-tradable good and money. We assume that the
production of the non-tradable good is performed by a regulated natural monopoly,
with a participation of foreign ownership. The regulated monopoly is privately informed
about its marginal cost of production and, therefore, an optimal regulation policy will
provide the monopoly with incentives to reveal its private information. We assume that
the country is credit-constrained in the sense that it cannot borrow money from foreign
investor at the equilibrium international interest rate. The country is a net exporter of
the tradable good and the monetary value of exports will determine how binding the
credit constraint is.
In our model, it turns out that the credit constraint translates into an additional con-
straint on maximum pro¯ts for the regulated ¯rm. The level of exports is somewhat
limited because it depends on the international price of the tradable good and the foreign
demand function, both variables beyond the control of the country. The credit constraint
implies that the capital out°ows, equal to the proportion of pro¯ts sent abroad, cannot
be higher than the monetary value of exports. It is, therefore, imposing an upper bound
on the level of pro¯ts the ¯rm can earn. As a consequence, the traditional cost of public
funds µ a la La®ont and Tirole (1993) is augmented by a new cost that re°ects how strong
the credit rationing is. Moreover, this shadow price decreases with the exchange rate,
implying that a devaluation has direct positive e®ects on the e±ciency of the regulated
sector. We show that the credit constraint has a negative impact on the overall e±-
ciency of the regulated sector. Indeed, if the credit constraint is binding, the regulator
has to reduce the rents given to e±cient ¯rms, but, due to the incentive problem, it can
only do so by reducing production. That is, the regulator will be willing to accept an
4e±ciency loss in compensation for a reduction of pressure on the trade balance.
One interesting ¯nding is that the reduction of the level of production is concentrated in
the ine±cient types. The new constraint obliges the principal to sacri¯ce e±ciency; since
the same set of incentive compatibility and participation constraints are still operative,
to minimize the e±ciency loss, transfers are reduced for the most e±cient type but not
her production, and production is reduced for all other types. Indeed, there is no point
in reducing production of the most e±cient ¯rm because rents are not a®ected by it.
We show that the e®ect of the credit constraint on e±ciency is more important the
larger the proportion of foreign ownership and the smaller the exchange rate. When
the proportion of foreign ownership increases, and the level of exports is ¯xed, the
government is obliged to reduce rents in order to satisfy the credit constraint. Therefore,
e±ciency is reduced further. Similarly, a higher exchange rate raises the value of exports,
increasing the rents the regulator can o®er to the ¯rm. Also, local opportunities for
reinvesting pro¯ts could help reducing or reversing the °ow and thus, alleviate the
credit constraint.
Of course, in a °exible exchange rate regime, the trade balance pressure could be reduced
through devaluation. Indeed, a higher exchange rate increases the monetary value of
exports, relaxing the credit constraint. However, devaluation is costly, since it increases
both the domestic price of tradable goods and the domestic value of the outside option
of the regulated ¯rm. The country, then, faces a trade o® when determining the optimal
exchange rate, so it may not want to completely relax the credit constraint. Assuming
that the country optimally sets the exchange rate, we show that optimal regulation
still requires lower e±ciency if the cost of relaxing the credit constraint completely is
5high. We also show that the optimal exchange rate is set such that the marginal cost of
devaluation is equal to its marginal bene¯t.1
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model and present the
main assumptions. In Section 3, we assume that the exchange rate is ¯xed. We obtain
the regulatory contract with and without credit constraint and we show that production
is further reduced when the credit constraint is binding. In Section 4 we assume that the
country can optimally determine de exchange rate in order to relax the credit constraint.
We show that, in general, the country will not devaluate to completely eliminate the
constraint, but it will choose the exchange rate for which the marginal cost equals the
marginal bene¯t. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
Consider a small economy with a tradable good, good T, a non-tradable (regulated)
good, good R and money. The tradable good is produced in a competitive industry,
through a constant returns to scale technology. This implies that in any equilibrium, the
pro¯ts of the tradable sector are equal to 0. Moreover, the assumption of small economy
implies that the international price of the tradable good is ¯xed in the international
markets and local production cannot in°uence the equilibrium price.
The non-tradable good industry is a regulated natural monopoly. The government
wants to determine the optimal way of designing the regulatory contract in order to
1Marginal costs of devaluation include the deviation of the real exchange rate with respect to the
long-run steady state and, in the case of highly indebted country, the marginal ¯scal e®ort needed to
collect taxes for buying foreign currency to domestic exporters.
6maximize social welfare. The regulated ¯rm has private information about its production
technology. The government knows that the cost of the regulated ¯rm is
C (qR) = µqR + k;
where qR is the quantity produced by the ¯rm, k is a ¯xed cost and the marginal cost,
µ, is such that µ 2 [µL;µH] according to a cumulative distribution function F (µ) with
density f (µ). This is common knowledge. We assume that the distribution function
satis¯es the monotone hazard rate property:
F(µ)
f(µ) is increasing in µ.
We assume that the surplus obtained is large enough, so the government wants to
produce even if the ¯rm turns out to be very ine±cient. So, shutting down production
is never an optimal option.
The pro¯t of the regulated ¯rm is







where pR is the price of the non-tradable good, pd
T is the domestic price of the tradable
good and t is a transfer from the regulator to the ¯rm (t could be negative, in which case
it is a tax paid by the ¯rm to the government). We assume that the marginal revenue,
pRqR is decreasing in qR. The domestic price of the tradable good is epT, where e is the
exchange rate and pT is the international price.
Domestic and foreign investors own the regulated ¯rm. The proportion of domestic
capital is ® 2 [0;1].
There is a representative consumer with quasilinear, separable preferences, whose utility
function is characterized by
U (qR;qT;m) = m + uR (qR) + uT (qT); (2)
7where m is the quantity of money consumed by the individual, qT is the quantity of
tradable good and uj (¢) is increasing and concave for j = R;T.
The representative consumer maximizes his utility taking as given the prices of the three





























The objective of the regulator is to determine the optimal regulatory policy. The reg-
ulator determines the quantity to be produced by the regulated ¯rm (or similarly, the
price of the regulated good) and the transfer to the ¯rm in order to maximize domestic
social welfare (DW). Domestic social welfare is equal to the sum of the consumer sur-
plus and the domestic pro¯ts of the regulated ¯rm (remember that ¯rms producing the
tradable goods make 0 pro¯ts given the assumption of constant returns to scale). We
assume that the government has to collect money through distortionary taxes in order
to subsidize the ¯rm, so in order to give 1$ to the ¯rm, consumers have to pay (1 + ¸)$
and ¸ is a measure of the cost of public funds.
DW = V (qR;qT) ¡ pRqR ¡ p
d
TqT ¡ (1 + ¸)t + ®¼R
V (qR;qT) + ¸pRqR ¡ p
d
TqT ¡ (1 + ¸)(µqR + k) ¡ (1 ¡ ® + ¸)¼R;













There are two reasons why the government dislikes rents in this context. First, rents
are relatively less valuable than consumer surplus because a proportion (1 ¡ ®) goes to
consumers abroad. Second, the government is obliged to distort the economy in order to
collect money to give rents. Therefore, it is optimal to ¯x prices above the marginal cost
in order to save in distortionary taxes. This is the traditional presentation, that assumes
that all ¯scal costs are captured by ¸. We will show that this parameter is insu±cient,
particularly for small open economies that face recurrent crisis in their external sector,
because it does not account for the costs introduced by international credit rationing.
3 Fixed exchange rate
In a context of complete (symmetric) information, the optimal regulatory contract would
give a rent just enough to make the ¯rm willing to participate whatever his type, because,
as argued before, rents are costly. Capital out°ows would be minimal and, therefore,
the credit constraint would have no e®ect on the optimal regulatory contract. Thus,
the credit constraint becomes relevant only if there is asymmetric information, in which
case the government ¯nds it optimal to give positive rents in order to make the ¯rm
reveal his type.
Assume ¯rst that the country has a tight monetary policy in which the exchange rate is
¯xed and normalized to 1. The regulator cannot use the exchange rate as an instrument
to relax the external sector constraint.
93.1 Benchmark: No credit constraint
We analyze ¯rst, as a benchmark, the case in which the country is not credit-constrained,
but information is still asymmetrically allocated. If the country is not credit-constrained,
it can borrow to compensate any di®erence between the capital account and the trade
account. So, the external sector does not impose any constraint on the amount of pro¯ts
the ¯rm can send to foreign owners. The only constraints the government has to consider
are, then, incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
Invoking the revelation principle, the regulator can restrict attention to incentive com-
patible direct revelation regulatory contracts, that is, regulatory contracts in which the
¯rm has to announce its marginal cost and has incentives to announce it truthfully.


























¼R (µ) ´ ¼R (µ;µ): (4)








Using the envelop theorem, this translates into the ¯rst order incentive compatibility
condition
_ ¼R (µ) ´
d¼R
dµ
(µ) = ¡qR (pR (µ)) 8µ 2 [µL;µH]; (5)
and the (local) second order incentive compatibility constraint _ qR (µ) · 0 guarantees
that telling the truth is indeed a local maximum.
10The single crossing condition is satis¯ed so these two constraints guarantee global in-
centive compatibility. Because we assume that shutting down is not an optimal policy,
the contract has to satisfy also participation constraints whatever the type of the ¯rm:
¼R (µ) ¸ ¼; 8µ 2 [µL;µH]: (6)
where ¼ is the rent of investing anywhere else in the world.
According to equation (5), in any incentive compatible regulatory contract rents are
decreasing in µ, so the only relevant participation constraint is
¼R (µH) ¸ ¼: (7)
Indeed, (5) and (7) imply that all the other participation constraints are satis¯ed.
In the next proposition, we describe the optimal regulatory contract when the country
is not credit-constrained and discuss the e®ects of foreign ownership.















R (¿)d¿ + ¼; (8)
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Quantities and rents are increasing in the proportion of domestic ownership.







V (qR;qT) + ¸pRqR ¡ pd
TqT ¡ (1 + ¸)(µqR + k)





_ ¼R (µ) = ¡qR;
¼R (µH) ¸ ¼;
_ qR · 0:
The participation constraint of type µH is binding at the optimum because rents are costly for
the regulator (the objective function is decreasing in ¼R).








¼R (µ)dF (µ) =
Z µH
µL






dF (µ) + ¼:







V (qR;qT) + ¸pRqR ¡ pd
TqT ¡ (1 + ¸)(µqR + k)







_ qR · 0:
We neglect the monotonicity constraint and we will check it ex post.











12pointwise maximization with respect to pR gives the following condition: 8µ 2 [µL;µH],
pB


















This is indeed the solution if the quantity pro¯le is decreasing in µ (or the price pro¯le is
increasing), which is true given the monotone hazard rate property and the assumption that
the marginal revenue is decreasing in qR.



















where MDW is the domestic welfare modi¯ed to incorporate the incentive constraint. So, the
price is decreasing in ®, meaning that quantities are increasing. Finally, rents increase when
quantities increase, so rents also increase with ®.
The ¯rst term in (9) is the Ramsey formula and corresponds to the mark-up over
marginal costs that would be optimal if the regulator knew the value of µ. Under
complete information some distortion is optimal because it helps saving on the cost
of public funds. The second term is the distortion due to informational issues and it
includes the e®ect of foreign ownership. As usual, the regulator will distort downward
all quantities except the quantity assigned to the most e±cient type, µL, in order to
reduce informational rents. No type would like to pretend to be µL, so there is no gain
in distorting this quantity.
The distortion is larger the smaller ®. The proportion ® measures how much the regula-
tor values the rents given to the ¯rm. The smaller ®, the smaller the share of domestic
capital and, therefore, the smaller the weight of rents in the domestic social welfare.
As a consequence, the smaller ®, the higher the cost in welfare terms of leaving rents.
13Therefore, as ® decreases, the bene¯t of reducing quantities in terms of lower rents
increases and the regulator ¯nds it optimal to increase distortions in order to reduce
rents.
3.2 Optimal contract with credit rationing
In this section, we look at the more interesting case in which the country is credit-
constrained. We keep the assumption of ¯xed exchange rate, but we assume now that
the country has no access to external ¯nancing. If the country is credit-rationed, any
de¯cit in the capital account must be compensated by a surplus in the trade account.
The regulated ¯rm has to send a share (1 ¡ ®) of pro¯ts to its foreign owners.2 This
generates a de¯cit in the capital account. We assume that the country can accumulate
foreign reserves but cannot borrow from foreign investors.
The country, then, faces the following constraint
(1 ¡ ®)¼R (µ) · X; 8µ 2 [µL;µH]: (10)
where X is the monetary value of exports. In this model, X is a constant from the
regulator's viewpoint because the price of the tradable good is ¯xed in the international
market and the demand for exports is only a function of the price.3 This constraint
2For simplicity (basically, to save on the number of parameters of the model), we assume here that
foreign owners send all their pro¯ts abroad and domestic owners keep all their pro¯ts inside the country.
This is not an important assumption. The only thing we need for our argument is that some proportion
of the pro¯ts of the regulated ¯rm go out of the country.
3This is a simplifying assumption that allows us to make the point in a clear and crude way. In a
more complete model, one can assume, for instance, that the demand for exports is a function of the
quality of the good and that this variable can be in some way in°uenced by the government.
14implies that the total amount of pro¯ts sent by the regulated ¯rm to the foreign owners
has to be smaller than the total monetary value of exports of the country whatever the
type of the ¯rm.
The e®ect of credit rationing is, thus, to introduce an upper bound on the rents the
regulator can give to induce truthful revelation. This will have, of course, huge conse-
quences in the optimal regulatory policy, because rents, at the end, are the only means
the regulator has to give incentives to the ¯rm to reveal its true marginal cost. In order
to make the problem interesting we assume that X < ¼B
R (µL), so the credit constraint is
binding when the ¯rm is e±cient if the proportion of foreign ownership is high enough.
Otherwise, the regulator could always implement the mechanism of Proposition 1 and
the credit constraint would have no e®ect on the regulatory scheme. We also assume
that X > ¼, so that the set of implementable rent pro¯les is non-empty.
If ® is close to 1, the credit constraint is not binding, because a very small proportion
of pro¯ts is sent to foreign owners. So, Proposition 1 describes the optimal regulatory
policy. Nevertheless, for any value of X < ¼B
R (µL), there is a value ®¤ (X) 2 [0;1] such
that if ® < ®¤ (X), the credit constraint becomes binding: the benchmark solution does
not satisfy the credit constraint for low values of µ. The regulator has to change the
optimal contract in order to account for the constraint.
One could think that the optimal thing to do is to set the contract as in Proposition
1 for all types for which the credit constraint is not binding and then, ¯x the rent for
e±cient types at the value of the constraint. Even though this seems very intuitive,
it goes against incentive compatibility and, therefore, cannot be implemented. Indeed,
according to equation (5), the rent schedule has to be decreasing, because the regulator






which, together with (5) implies that the credit constraint is satis¯ed for any possible
value of the marginal cost.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1 shows an example in which ® < ®¤ (X). Therefore, the benchmark contract, the
contract without credit rationing, does not satisfy the credit constraint for any µ < µ¤.
The regulator has to reduce all rents in order to satisfy both incentive compatibility and
credit constraint.
Of course, in order to reduce rents in an incentive compatible way, the regulator has to
distort further the quantities produced. In the next proposition, we show the optimal
way to do it.















R (¿)d¿ + ¼; (12)
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where ¯ ¸ 0 is the multiplier of the credit constraint.




DW (qR (µ);¼R (µ);µ)f (µ)dµ
subject to
_ ¼R (µ) = ¡qR (µ); ¼R (µH) = ¼; ¼R (µL) free,
X
1 ¡ ®
¡ ¼R (µ) ¸ 0; 8µ 2 [µL;µH]:
The Hamiltonian of the problem is
H = [V (pR (qR);pT) + ¸pR (qR)qR ¡ pTqT ¡ (1 + ¸)µqR
¡(1 ¡ ® + ¸)¼R]f (µ) ¡ ¹(µ)qR
and the Lagrangian is







where ¹(¢) is the adjoint variable associated with the incentive constraint and » (¢) is the
multiplier associated with the credit constraint.













= (1 ¡ ® + ¸)f (µ) + » (µ) = _ ¹(µ); (17)
¹(µL) = 0: (18)
Moreover, the incentive constraint implies that the rent schedule is decreasing, meaning that
» (µ) = 0 8µ 2 (µL;µH].
The existence of constraints on the state variable implies that we need to allow the adjoint
variable ¹ to jump at µL. So, from (17) we have that for all µ 2 (µL;µH]















¹(µ) = ¹(µL) + ¯ = ¯;
for some ¯ ¸ 0. Of course, if ¯ = 0 the function ¹ is continuous. Note also that condition
(17) has to be satis¯ed only at points in which ¹ is continuous.
Suppose that ¯ = 0. Then, replacing (19) in (16) and rearranging terms gives that 8µ 2 [µL;µH]
qC
R (µ) = qB
R (µ) and ¼C
R (µ) = ¼B
R (µ):









R (µL) < 0
¯ > 0 and the adjoint variable is discontinuous at µL. Moreover, for ¯ > 0, qC
R (µ) is also
discontinuous at µL and we obtain equations (12) to (15).
We still have to prove that the quantity pro¯le is decreasing in µ. A su±cient condition
for that is to have ¯ small (the constraint is not too stringent) and/or the density function
non-increasing (e.g., with a uniform distribution).
So, whenever the credit constraint is binding (¯ > 0), quantities are further distorted
from the benchmark case. The reason is that, in order to satisfy the credit constraint,
the regulator is forced to reduce the rents for all types below µ¤. However, incentive
compatibility implies that she has to reduce rents also for types above µ¤ to avoid
misreporting, because the rent pro¯le has to be decreasing according to equation (5).
On the other hand, incentive compatibility implies that the only means the regulator
has to reduce rents is to reduce quantities.
18An interesting (technical) point is that when the credit constraint is binding the optimal
production pro¯le is discontinuous at µL:
q
C
R (µL) = q
B






Indeed, all quantities in the interval (µL;µH] are reduced below the benchmark level in
order to be able to reduce the rent of the most e±cient type, and this new distortion is
independent of the level of e±ciency, because the credit constraint is also independent
of µ. However, at µL it is costless to jump to the ¯rst best level of production because
no rents have to be given to more e±cient types. Moreover, the bene¯t of the jump
is strictly positive because of the increase in allocative e±ciency. Therefore, assigning
the ¯rst best production to the most e±cient type is always optimal. The optimal
production schedule is depicted in Figure 2. Notice, however, that because types are
continuous the probability of observing a µL ¯rm is actually equal to 0. In a discrete
type case, it is easy to verify that the production of the most e±cient type is always
¯rst best. For an illustration with 2 types, see Section 4.1. Incentive compatibility, on


















INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Proposition 3 If the multiplier of the credit constraint, ¯, is positive, it decreases with
the value of exports X and with the exchange rate e. For any µ, qC
R(µ) increases with
these two parameters.










(¿)d¿ 8µ 2 [µL;µH]:
























































Moreover, conditions (13) and (20) are true for any µ and ¯ is independent of µ. This implies














































The multiplier ¯ is a decreasing function of the value of exports and the exchange rate,
because both higher exports and a higher exchange rate relax the credit constraint,
increasing the rents the regulator can o®er to the ¯rm.
20The e®ect of the proportion of domestic ownership on the multiplier is ambiguous. Since
the upper bound on the rents increases with ®, it can be shown that the quantity pro¯le
must increase with ® for some values of µ. Moreover, it can be shown that if
@qC
R
@® (µ¤) > 0
it must be that
@qC
R
@® (µ) > 0 for any µ > µ¤. This implies that the quantity pro¯le increases
with the proportion of domestic ownership when the ¯rm is relatively ine±cient. When
the ¯rm is low cost, the sign of
@qC
R
@® (µ) cannot be determined in general. In fact, if there
is some value of µ for which the quantity pro¯le decreases with ®, then the multiplier ¯
increases with ®. Nevertheless, overall e±ciency, as measured by domestic social welfare
always increases with ®.
Of course, the fact that ¯ is positive is completely associated with the asymmetry of
information. Indeed, if the regulator knew the ¯rm's marginal cost, no type of ¯rm
would receive a rent above the outside option, ¼ and, therefore, there would be no need
to distort quantities. Indeed, in that case, the credit constraint in not binding whatever
the values of ® and µ.
4 Flexible exchange rate
The government can get an additional degree of freedom by playing with the exchange
rate. In particular, a devaluation increases the domestic value of exports (or decreases
the foreign value of pro¯ts) and, therefore, relaxes the credit constraint.
Suppose the tradable sector produces with a constant return to scale technology but its
production is limited by a ¯xed resource, L, say land. This implies that
21yT = qT + xT · L:
where yT is the local production of tradable goods. Exports are then limited by the size
of the resource. If the country wants to relax the credit constraint increasing exports, it
has to induce a decrease in the local consumption of the tradable good, which is done by
increasing its price through the devaluation. Devaluation has then two positive e®ects
on the credit constraint. It increases the value of each exported unit and increases the
units exported because it reduces domestic consumption. To guarantee an equilibrium
in the resource market, it must be that the price of the tradable good equals the price
of land, w. This gives the equilibrium condition:
epT = w:
This implies, in particular, that any devaluation increases the pro¯ts of the land owners,
via the increase of the price of land.
Of course, the government has to bear in mind that any devaluation has a negative
impact on domestic welfare coming from two di®erent fronts. On the one hand, it
increases the domestic price of tradable goods, reducing the consumer surplus. On the
other hand, the domestic value of the outside option of the ¯rm increases with the
exchange rate, so the whole pro¯t pro¯le has to move upwards in order to satisfy the
new participation constraint. In particular, the participation constraint writes now:
¼R (µ) ¸ e¼:
The new credit constraint is
(1 ¡ ®)¼R (µ) · eX (e); 8µ 2 [µL;µH]; (21)
22with
X (e) = pT (L ¡ qT (e));
and we normalize the international price to pT = 1.
We assume that the monetary authority is in charge of ¯xing the exchange rate. The
regulator, on the other hand, designs the regulatory contract. We model a sequential
game between these two government agencies. The monetary authority is the leader, and
chooses the exchange rate taking into account the e®ects of her decision on the regulatory
contract. Having observed the exchange rate ¯xed by the monetary authority (which
determines the credit constraint), the regulator chooses the contract. Since we are not
interested in looking at con°icts inside the government, we assume that both agencies
are interested in maximizing domestic social welfare.4 The idea behind this timing is
that there are some general rules (like the monetary policy) which are ¯xed in advanced
because the government pretends to in°uence other agents' decisions. More particular
rules (like regulatory contracts) are designed following these general rules.
In order to incorporate all the e®ects of a change in the exchange rate, we assume that
devaluating the currency entails a cost C (e), increasing and convex in e. For instance,
suppose that agents in this country have a stock of debt expressed in foreign currency.
Then, a higher exchange rate increases the value of the external debt, which a®ects the
agents' welfare in a negative way. We do not explicitly model such an e®ect, but it is
certainly not negligible in reality.5
4Given that the tradable and regulated sectors are independent in this model, except for their
link through the credit constraint, we would obtain the same result by assuming that the regulator is
concerned only with domestic social surplus within the regulated sector itself.
5Imagine that D is the stock of foreign debt, measured in foreign currency. The value of this debt in




qT ; the elasticity of domestic demand of the tradable good with
respect to the exchange rate. In the next proposition we obtain the optimal exchange
rate and the optimal regulatory policy.




¤) + (1 ¡ ® + ¸)¼] = ¯
µ







b) The optimal regulatory contract is the same as in Proposition 2 and the only e®ect
of the exchange rate on the incentive scheme is through the value of the multiplier, ¯.
Proof. We solve the game backwards. Given the exchange rate ¯xed by the monetary
authority, the regulator chooses a regulatory contract, (qR(µ;e);¼R(µ;e)) to maximize social
welfare. Since the exchange rate has no direct impact on the regulatory contract, except
through the multiplier ¯, the contract is the same as in Proposition 2: (qC
R(µ;e);¼C
R(µ;e)).
Moreover, given Proposition 3, we know that the quantity pro¯le is increasing in the exchange
rate and ¯ is decreasing in the exchange rate. Knowing this, the monetary authority chooses
the exchange rate that maximizes domestic social welfare.
First, remember that the exchange rate modi¯es the domestic price of the tradable goods:
pd
T = epT = e;
which a®ects itself the demand for tradable goods.



















R ¡ (1 + ¸)µqC
R ¡ eqT ¡ C (e)



















local currency is eD. To make this payment, the government has to raise taxes for a value of (1+¸)eD.
The cost of the devaluation in this case is C(e) = (1 + ¸)eD. For other motivations of the cost of the
devaluation, see Diaz-Alejandro (1963), Krugman and Taylor (1978) and Solimano (1986).
24and the monetary authority chooses e knowing that w = e.

















Now, given that the regulator maximizes social welfare under the same constraints, the optimal
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e2f ¡ C0 (e)
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dF (µ) = C0 (e):






















The optimal exchange rate is then implicitly de¯ned by6
e¤ £









6The second order condition is satis¯ed if the demand function for tradable goods and/or the function
C (e) are convex enough.
25The interpretation of condition (22) is straightforward. Increasing the exchange rate has
a cost in terms of lower consumer surplus, because the domestic price of tradable goods
is higher and in terms of an increase in the outside option of the ¯rm. The marginal
cost of increasing the exchange rate, in domestic currency is
e[C
0 (e) + qT + (1 ¡ ® + ¸)¼]:
The marginal bene¯t of devaluating is given by the increase in the upper bound on
pro¯ts that can be sent by foreign owners of the ¯rm evaluated in domestic currency








So, the optimal exchange rate is such that the marginal cost is equal to the marginal
bene¯t.
4.1 An illustration: The two-type case
To give a better idea of the e®ects of the credit constraint on the optimal contract,
consider the following example. Assume that
µ 2 fµL;µHg and Pr(µ = µL) = º:









































¡eqT + wL ¡ C (e);
26where qi
R = qR (µi) and ¼i
R = ¼R (µi) for i = L;H and w = e.
The relevant constraints are the incentive constraint of an e±cient ¯rm, the participation










Maximizing with respect to quantities and rents, the other ¯rst order conditions are
° ¡ ¯ = º (1 ¡ ® + ¸);
































(1 ¡ º)(1 + ¸)pR (qH
R)
:
Both ° and ¹ are strictly positive, meaning that the incentive constraint of a good type
and the participation constraint of a bad type are both binding. The credit constraint



















º(1 ¡ ® + ¸)¢µ
(1 ¡ º)(1 + ¸)pR (qB
H)
























27From the ¯rst order conditions we have that there is no distortion for the e±cient type
and the intuition for this result is the same as in the continuous case. On the other hand,
the distortion for the ine±cient type, which is positive because the incentive constraint
is binding, can be written
°¢µ
(1 ¡ º)(1 + ¸)pR (qH
R)
=
[º (1 ¡ ® + ¸) + ¯]¢µ
(1 ¡ º)(1 + ¸)pR (qH
R)
(23)
and increases with the multiplier of the credit constraint, ¯.7 The qualitative results
are, therefore, the same as in the case of continuous types. The optimal contract is
represented in Figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
If the country is not credit-constrained, the optimal regulatory policy would be to set
qH = qB
H. However, the rent that has to be given to the e±cient ¯rm is too high and the
credit constraint becomes binding. Therefore, the regulator is forced to ¯x the pro¯t
of the e±cient ¯rm at the value of exports, implying that, in order to keep incentives,
the quantity produced by the ine±cient ¯rm has to be reduced to qC
H. The quantity
produced by the e±cient ¯rm is still the ¯rst-best quantity, because there are no gains
in reducing it.
From the ¯rst order conditions with respect to the exchange rate we obtain
¯qT (¾ (e) + ´T (e)) = (1 ¡ ®)(¹¼ ¡ qT (e)¾ (e) + C
0 (e));
7In this two-type case, it is clear that there is no distortion for the bad type under complete
information, even if the country is credit-constrained, because in that case both ° and ¯ are equal
to 0.
28where ¾ (e) = L
qT(e)¡1 ¸ 0 is the ratio of exports on domestic consumption and measures
the export e®ort of the country.8
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a model of optimal regulation in a small open economy
subject to credit constraints. The model is especially relevant for developing countries
in which the regulated sector plays an important role and foreign investments in the
regulated sector are non-negligible. In such a context, credit constraints have a negative
e®ect on the overall e±ciency of the regulated sector beyond the traditional e®ect coming
from the need to provide enough incentives. Indeed, the country is obliged to reduce
production in the regulated sector below the (incentive compatible) e±cient levels in
order to satisfy both incentive and credit constraints.
The credit constraint puts an upper bound on the level of pro¯ts the regulated ¯rm
can send abroad to foreign owners, determined by the value of net exports. This limits
the rents the regulator can give to the ¯rm in order to obtain truthful revelation. The
government is then obliged either to reduce e±ciency in the regulated sector or to
promote exports in order to relax the credit constraint.
This model constitutes an attempt to include some general equilibrium e®ects in the
optimal regulation analysis. This is not a general equilibrium model, but it makes
the link between regulation and the external sector. In particular, we show that the
8Without credit constraints, the optimal exchange rate is such that ¹¼+C0 (e) = qT (e)¾ (e), so the
optimal exchange rate is higher when the country is credit-constrained.
29design of the optimal regulatory policy cannot be independent of the performance of
the external sector if the country has not access to the international credit markets.
Moreover, the design of a tight monetary policy associated with a ¯xed exchange rate
has an important impact on the (optimal) distortions introduced in regulation. This
is true even in a model in which the tradable and non-tradable sectors are not related
neither technologically nor through preferences.
We have made many simplifying assumptions in order to make the model tractable and
be able to draw neat conclusions. First, we have assumed that foreign investors send all
their pro¯ts abroad. This is generally not true, since a proportion of the pro¯ts may be
reinvested in the same ¯rm or even in other sectors at the local level. In this sense, the
credit constraint may not be so tight. However, some domestic investors may want to
invest part of their share of the pro¯ts in foreign assets, increasing the capital out°ows.
In any case, it is likely that during periods of ¯nancial distress for the country (that
is, when the credit constraint becomes relevant), investors (both domestic and foreign)
are more willing to move their capital to safer places. Second, we have left aside any
dynamic considerations by looking at a static model. In reality, dynamic issues are very
important in these kinds of problems, even abstracting from renegotiation issues. If
the ¯rm turns out to be ine±cient and thus earns low rents, the government would be
able to accumulate international reserves to be used to relax the credit constraint in
the following period. Finally, in order to isolate the e®ects of the credit constraint, we
have modelled the tradable and regulated sectors as completely independent, both in
consumption and in production. Of course, accounting for crossed e®ects is an important
matter. For instance, many regulated ¯rms produce public utilities, used as inputs by all
30other ¯rms, including the producers of tradable goods. If the credit constraint induces
lower production of public utilities, this will have a negative impact on the production
of tradable goods, worsening the ability of the country to generate foreign currency.
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